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Abstract
In this paper the authors attempt to analyze changes in U.S. foreign policy towards Central 
East Europe (CEE) during the term of oﬃ  ce of Barack Obama and perception of these changes 
in the region. For countries of the region, especially Poland, which is main subject of this article, 
this feature of U.S. policy is vital for sense of international security. During last decade there 
have been great changes in international situation of CEE (e. g. accession to NATO and the EU) 
and also U.S. foreign policy emphasize on new challenges, concentrated mostly in Asia region, 
not in Europe – zone of prosperity and development. Current American point of view on 
CEE and Poland may be summarized in six points: Cooperation and improvement of relations 
with Russia; National Missile Defense; NATO’s new Strategy Concept; Eastern Partnership; 
Energetic security and climate changes; Military cooperation. Th ese facts force a new approach 
to mutual relations, not always noticed in Poland. Polish politicians, instead of moaning 
about abandoning by the most signiﬁ cant ally (because of Washington’s resignation from the 
construction of “missile shield” assets in Poland), should direct its attention to creating a more 
self-vision of the Polish foreign and security policy. Poland should concentrate on seeking the 
partners and allies among the closest neighbors, in particular within the European Union.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy. For the vital interests 
of Central East Europe countries (CEE), especially Poland, it has been interesting, 
how the new American president will create his policy towards this region. Shall the 
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CEE countries function as “special relations” category of partners, or shall be treated 
as an integral part of European and Euro-Atlantic international organizations? Shall 
they become a sort of “ buﬀ er zone” between Collective Security Treaty Organization 
and Western Europe? In this paper authors attempt to give answers to these questions.
It is worth explaining why the article concentrates on U.S. relations with Poland, 
and not the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe. Not without reason one 
can say that Poland is the most important political factor in the region, both because 
of its location, size and demographic potential, as well as speciﬁ c – you could say the 
most “expressive” – relations with USA and other countries. For years “the American 
dream” was main perspective of perception of USA in Poland. Positive feelings to 
America were and are strong enough to endure international situation changes and 
negative attitude of other EU countries.1 Poland remembers U.S. eﬀ orts after soviet 
bloc collapse to strengthen independence and democracy in CEE countries, especially 
Partnership for Peace, which ended with their accession to NATO.2
General principles of Barack Obama’s foreign policy
It must be admitted that Barack Obama has embraced the presidency during 
a diﬃ  cult period. In the world of geopolitics at the forefront of the race was China 
because of its growing economic strength.  It was necessary to solve the problem 
of global Balkans,3 already mentioned above, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conﬂ ict, Iran’s nuclear program, Pakistan – a country with 
a nuclear bomb and the extremists destabilizing the government, the North Korean 
nuclear program and, ﬁ nally, the issue of renewal of the expiring in December 2009 
START. Additionally, unilateralism and neoconservatism in the way of formulating 
a concept of foreign policy divided Europe into two camps: “New Europe”4 and “Old 
1 Signiﬁ cant here is statement of then President of France Jacques Chirac, that Poland and other CEE 
countries “missed a good opportunity to keep quiet,” when they supported U.S. policy towards Iraq in 2003. 
“New Europe’ backs EU on Iraq,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2775579.stm (accessed 
October 27, 2010).
2 See also: Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Aﬀ airs 73, no. 1 ( January/February 1995): 
33–34.
3 By the term “global Balkans” Zbigniew Brzezinski deﬁ nes the area of Eurasia between Europe and 
the Far East, rich in oil and inhabited by Muslims. According to Brzeziński, this region could become the 
epicenter of future conﬂ icts. More: Brzeziński, „Hegemonic Quicksand”, Th e National Interest (Winter 
2003/2004); Brzeziński, Druga szansa (Warszawa: Świat Książki, 2008), 23–28.
4 Th is name was mostly popular during George W. Bush’s rule, when there was urgent need to ﬁ nd 
political support for Iraq invasion. Deﬁ nition properly representing this point of view says, that “New 
Europe” represents, “with some justiﬁ cation, the interests of the United States in [EU]. In this part of 
Europe, one does not ﬁ nd the kind of raw anti-Americanism rampant in many parts of Old Europe. Even 
though 90 percent of the Polish population opposes their government’s decision to deploy a large number 
of troops in Iraq, anti-war sentiment has not been translated into hostility toward Americans. Also, all four 
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Europe,” speciﬁ cally France and Germany. Th us Russia had an excellent opportunity 
to play Europe oﬀ  against the United States, even by the idea of missile defense 
project.5 With so many new challenges and threats in the international arena, Poland 
and  CEE have lost their  position in  American foreign policy, they had to  show 
themselves as more active actors in international relations, more useful for Obama.
Since the beginning of the election campaign it was known that Barack Obama 
was very cautious of comparisons to his predecessor George W. Bush and his 
neoconservative vision of foreign policy. As a presidential candidate, during a speech in 
Denver, in August 2008, Obama announced the end of Bush’s bungled policy.6 Obama 
seemed very uncomfortable with the idea that the United States had an exceptional 
and important role to play in in the world, and through its unique history America had 
a special responsibility.7 Th e new president during his speech in Trinidad and Tobago 
in April 2009 emphasized that America wanted to work with other countries as “an 
equal partner” rather than as the “exceptional” nation.8
Obama also sought earnestly to avoid comparisons to Bill Clinton and his so-called 
globalist strategy of designating a policy of evasion and avoidance of responsibility. In 
his article published in “Foreign Aﬀ airs” he emphasized the close link between security 
and prosperity of Americans and people living outside the U.S. – as a representative 
value of the Democratic Party, Obama was a decided supporter of Wilsonianism.9
In practice however, Obama’s Cabinet could indicate a return to political realism in 
the style of Richard Nixon, when it could be hold a dialogue with all. On the position 
of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remained, oﬃ  cial and unoﬃ  cial advisers were 
Madeleine Albright, William Perry, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger.10 
Hillary Clinton, advocate of repairing damages in U.S. foreign policy done by the 
previous administration, was elected a Secretary of State. She also declared using 
made these troop deployments with the full knowledge that this action would alienate major EU partners 
such as France and Germany.” Richard J. Krickus, Iron troikas: the new treat from the east (Carlise: US Army 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 8.
5 See more: Stephen R. Graubard, “A Broader Agenda: Beyond Bush-Era Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Aﬀ airs 88, no. 1 ( January/February 2009).
6 Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: American Promise, (Democratic Convention), Denver, CO, August 28, 
2008, http://www.barackobama.com/2008/08/28/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_108.php (accessed 
February 25, 2010).
7 Kim R. Holmes, Henry R. Nau, Helle C. Dale, “Th e Obama Doctrine: Hindering American Foreign 
Policy,” Heritage Lectures 1172 (November 29, 2010): 3.
8 Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas. Opening Ceremony, Hyatt Regency, Port of 
Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, April 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_oﬃ  ce/Remarks-by-
the-President-at-the-Summit-of-the-Americas-Opening-Ceremony (accessed November 29, 2010). 
9 Barack Obama , “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Aﬀ airs 86, no.4 ( July/August 2007): 
2–16.
10 See more: Walter Russel Mead, “Th e Carter syndrome,“ Foreign Policy ( January/February 2010); 
Joanna Klonsky, Foreign Policy Brain Trusts: Obama’s Advisers, Council on Foreign Relations, 11.11.2008. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16188/foreign_policy_brain_trusts.html (accessed March 1, 2010).
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a Joseph Nye’s smart power11 – “the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, 
economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination 
of tools, for each situation.”12 Judging by his appointments, Barack Obama was not 
going to focus on creating a rigid framework of foreign policy, he wanted to create 
a ﬂ exible model based on rhetoric of conciliation and soft power theory, for responding 
to speciﬁ c situations.13
As an example of the Obama’s smart power inspiration was a desire to return 
to multilateralism and greater involvement in cooperation with international 
organizations. Obama wanted to put more pressure on the partnership, but also 
a greater sharing of responsibility by Europe. Th is has led to the reconstruction of the 
transatlantic ties through greater European  participation in peacekeeping missions, 
increase military and ﬁ nancial support. It should be mentioned that Europe wasn’t 
a priority in Obama’s policy, he supported further EU integration to consolidate 
transatlantic partnership.14 Th e Lisbon Treaty, advanced the Common Security and 
Defense Policy, was welcomed as a major milestone in a world’s history.15
In the beginning Obama’s main goal was to rebuild the American position in 
the world. Th e latest National Security Strategy, released May 27, 2010, continued 
implementation of the previous guideline. Th e document lays out a strategic approach 
for advancing American interests, including the security of the American people, 
a growing U.S. economy, support for American values, and an international order that 
can address 21st century16 challenges. Th e main issues on which the United States 
should focus are:
 • Th reat from al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan
 • Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq
 • Keeping Nuclear Weapons Out of the Hands of Terrorists
 • Promoting Peace and Security in Israel and the Middle East
 • Re-energizing America’s Alliances
 • Maintaining Core American Values
 • Ending the crisis in Darfur and ensuring Sudan’s long-term stability
11 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Richard L. Armitage, CSIS Commission on Smart Power. A smarter, more secure 
America, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.
12 Ibid. “Clinton: Use ‘Smart Power’ In Diplomacy,” CBS News, January 13, 2009. http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2009/01/13/politics/main4718044.shtml (accessed March 1, 2010). 
13 Nye, “Barack Obama and soft power,” Huﬀ Post, posted: June 12, 2008, http://www.huﬃ  ngtonpost.
com/joseph-nye/barack-obama-and-soft-pow_b_106717.html (accessed March 1, 2010).
14 “Obama welcome ‘Strenghtened’ EU”, EUBusiness, November 3, 2009, http://www.eubuisiness.com/
news-eu/treaty-chech-us.1a8 (accessed March 1, 2010). 
15 Clinton, Remarks with EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Catherine Ashton after their meeting, 
U.S. Department of State, January 21, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135530.htm 
(accessed March 10, 2010).
16 Th e National Security Strategy, May 27, 2010, 1–6.
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 • Restoring American leadership in Latin America
 • Ensuring energy security and ﬁ ghting climate change.17
Th is agenda shows that Obama’s priorities in foreign policy focus on engagement 
in core threats to security in various places around the world and rebuilding U.S. global 
position. Crucially important was also continuation of the war on terrorism. Th e 
new president urged not to stop ﬁ ghting, but he expected a greater commitment not 
only from Europe but also from Pakistan, the main hideouts of extremists.18 Obama 
followers were most interested in the problem of Iraq and U.S. troops stationed 
there. But reality surpassed the dreams: the president originally promised withdrawal 
of troops for 16 months after taking oﬃ  ce, and then made it from discussions with 
military commanders. Finally, year 2011 was concluded as the date for withdrawing 
American troops from Iraq.19 
In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the main advisors, Obama should 
transform American foreign policy based on a following important issues:
 • United States’ current world role is not deﬁ ned by “global war on terror” and 
perception of Islam as the enemy,
 • It should begin serious negotiation with Iran on its nuclear program;
 • Th e counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan should be part of political 
undertaking, rather than largely military one;
 • Th e eventual goal of the United States is “non-nuclear” world and greater 
commitment to signiﬁ cantly reduce nuclear arsenal;
 • Improving U.S. – Russian relations not on geopolitical post- Cold War terms, but 
based on mutually acceptable conditions,
 • Th e United States should give deeper meaning of transatlantic partnership, 
compensation for damage caused by the controversy of previous years , they should 
repair the damage caused by the controversy of previous years.20
Trying to relate these guidelines to the relations of Poland (or whole CEE) with 
the U.S., we must pay attention mainly to the two points. Firstly: the global war on 
terror, where continuation of Polish military aid for U.S. was for Obama an important 
factor from the moral and political reasons rather than military one. Despite the U.S. 
largest military engagement, America not alone lead the ﬁ ght against international 
17 Foreign policy – guiding principles, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy (accessed 
October 29, 2010).
18 Andrew Nagorski  , “Missions critical,” Newsweek, February 02, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/
id/183615 (accessed January 20, 2010). 
19 Craig Whitlock, “U.S. plans for possible delay in Iraq withdrawal”, Th e Washington Post, February 23, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022202933.html 
(accessed April 15, 2010).
20 Brzezinski, “From hope to audacity. Appraising Obama’s foreign policy,” Foreign Aﬀ air 86, no. 1 
( January/February 2010): 16–17. 
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terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Intervention in these countries was a joint decision 
of the democratic nations to spread democracy around the world.
Secondly: strengthening transatlantic partnership. Barack Obama rejected the
distinction between the “New” and “Old Europe” and is strongly committed to
the unity within the EU. Moreover U.S. is about to engage close consultation in security 
issues bilaterally, as well as on multilateral board of all 27 NATO countries. NATO 
is considered as preeminent security alliance in the world today, able to promote 
security, deter vital threats, and defend its people.21 Poland, as an experienced member 
of the Partnership for Peace should take advantage of the opportunity to re-emerge 
in American politics, by mediating between NATO and the potential new members, 
especially post-communist countries. Complement this concept could be EU Eastern 
Partnership program created by Poland in cooperation with Sweden, assuming long-
term cooperation between Brussels and the former Soviet countries.
Case of Poland in U.S. foreign policy
Past few years weakened the positive attitude of Poland to the U.S. Firstly, due to 
the resignation of President Obama’s administration of the National Missile Defense 
(NMD) project, as proposed by the George W. Bush. Th e most unpleasant aspect of 
this resignation was choice of the announcement day: 17th of September is associated 
in Poland with betrayal. Secondly, U.S. are more involved in Middle East, overcoming 
AfPak and Iraqi complicated situation and also trying to resolve the question of Iran. 
Th irdly, there’s still unsolved issue of visas. Th e last, but probably most important 
aspect of this situation is European integration. With growing political, and especially 
economical, engagement of EU in Poland, the meaning of America is relatively 
lowering. In recent six years real engagement of Poland in Europe has also increased 
rapidly. In the same time U.S. was still engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan and had to 
increase interest in East Asia region, rethink relations with China, so there was no 
additional involvement in CEE, except unrealized plans of NMD installations.
Moreover, there can be seen new U.S. policy towards CEE countries. During Bush 
presidency there was tendency to improve bilateral relations with European countries, 
what was much easier than trying to cooperate with weak, in respect of foreign policy, 
authorities in Brussels. Nowadays we can observe kind of U.S. answer for strengthening 
integration within the EU, what manifests in will to cooperate more with whole 
international organizations, than have special relations with one, especially friendly or 
important country. Th e Lisbon Treaty, which structured and uniﬁ ed European policy, 
made  it possible to  systematize  the whole  conversation with  the EU, not  only  with 
21 National Security Strategy…, 41.
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individual countries. So U.S. expects coherent and coordinated EU foreign policy.22 
Th at is why presently CEE countries – members of the EU – are treated as a part of this 
organization. But the ﬁ rst year of Obama’s terms gave the hard time the CEE states and 
taught them a rough lesson of new Washington’s realities. Th e relationship with CEE 
were relegated to the background and central place in the politics of Washington took 
mentioned engagement in core threats to security in various places around the world.
What do the USA expect from Poland and CEE 
countries?
U.S. perceives CEE countries among them Poland through the few critical issues. 
According to Philip H. Gordon, current Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian Aﬀ airs23 American point of view on Poland and CEE may be summarized 
in six points:
1. Cooperation and improvement of relations with Russia.
2. National Missile Defense.
3. NATO’s new Strategy Concept.
4. Eastern Partnership.
5. Energetic security and climate changes
6. Military cooperation.
With respect to Poland and other CEE, according to the Authors of this paper, the 
individual points require an elaborated commentary:
Cooperation and improvement of relations with Russia. Th is refers to Obama’s 
“reset” of U.S.-Russia relations to repair the weak and deteriorating cooperation. 
Th anks to that change, and probably due to Dmitry Medvedev’s modernization plans,24 
Th e New START and agreement on military transit to Afghanistan were signed. It 
22 More: Sally McNamara, “EU Foreign Policymaking Post-Lisbon: Confused and Contrived,” 
Backgrounder 2388, March 16, 2010.
23 Paper was presented at CSIS-PISM Conference: Th e United States and Central Europe: Diverging 
or Converging Strategic Interests, Washington, DC, November 4, 2009. Polish translation: Philip H. 
Gordon, „Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia: amerykański punkt widzenia,” transl. J. Dołęga, Polski Przegląd 
Dyplomatyczny 52, no. 6 (listopad–grudzień 2009): 17–25.
24 President D. Medvedev published on October 10, 2009 article Forward Russia!, which is a plan of 
modernization of Russian Federation political, economic and social system by ﬁ ghting four Russian “plagues”: 
everlasting economic backwardness, the habit of existence thanks to exports of raw materials and exchange 
them into ﬁ nished good, everlasting corruption paternalistic attitudes widespread in society. Th en on 
November 29, 2009 there was announced by D. Medvedev project of European Security Treaty, to create 
paneuropean security zone and “to end Cold War legacy.” Д. Медведев, Россия, вперёд! Статья Дмитрия 
Медведева, http://www.kremlin.ru/news/5413 (accessed October 27, 2010); Проект Договора 
о европейской безопасности, http://news.kremlin.ru/news/6152 (accessed October 27, 2010).
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is important for Warsaw that U.S.-Russian relations have been free from tension and 
confrontation, which may result in increasing military threat in the CEE. Th e very 
last example of this was threat of deployment of nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad in 
response to the U.S. plan of distribution in Poland elements of NMD.
National Missile Defense. Even during the election campaign, Obama spoke 
skeptically about the idea of NMD, he  did not perceive the system as a guarantee 
for the European and global security. On the other hand, Polish government had no 
doubt – the war in Georgia sealed the sense of fairness of the Polish decisions. But the 
signals coming from overseas indicated a change in the American course in relation 
with Poland. During a conversation with Obama as a candidate, Foreign Minister 
Radoslaw Sikorski told that in case of the Democrats’ victory in the presidential 
elections the United States must verify whether the anti-missile system really do not 
endanger the safety of Russia. Barack Obama, as a new president, had to deal with the 
eﬀ ects of the economic crisis, hence the declaration of cutting unnecessary spending 
seemed to be most on the spot and the NMD was on the list of the unnecessary 
expenditures. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressed his hope that Obama 
will end the selﬁ sh foreign policy practiced by George W. Bush, who wanted to force 
Russia to accede to a new arms race.25 In relation to Poland Barack Obama insisted 
that she was a loyal and important strategic partner as evidenced by an increase of the 
Polish contingent in Afghanistan. When it comes to NMD, Obama used a strategy of 
evasion. Th roughout oﬃ  cials meetings and talks there were no speciﬁ c declarations 
and promises. Even during the NATO summit in Krakow, Robert Gates, in an 
interview with Defense Minister Bogdan Klich avoided any strong statement on the 
NMD. At last, in his famous speech at the Hradčany Square in Prague president 
Obama declared that the NMD project will be needed as long as Iran continues to 
develop its nuclear program, great threat to the rest of the world.26 Additionally, a new 
U.S. military budget has been cut about $ 1.4 billion, and United States began to 
consider the Russian oﬀ er of creation of a common missile defense system with radar 
stations in Armavir (Krasnodar Krai, Russia) and Gabala (Azerbaijan’s territory). 
After months of U.S. administration evasive behavior, the ﬁ nal decision was forced 
by Kremlin: there were signals that Moscow will not agree to reductions in strategic 
arms, if the missile shield will be built in Poland and Czech Republic. After cancelling 
NMD project appeared the proposals of Polish and Czech participation in the 
implementation of a new missile defense system in Europe, aimed more on the ﬁ ght 
against missiles of short and long-range, based on the method of intercepting missiles 
from both sea and land, but the governments of both countries were no longer in the 
25 Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации, 5 ноября 2008 года, Москва, 
Большой Кремлёвский дворец, http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1968 (accessed October 27, 2010).
26 Remarks by president Barack Obama, Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_oﬃ  ce/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered 
(accessed October 27, 2010).
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larger illusions. Barack Obama quickly seized the opportunity to return to the idea of 
missile defense system which consists of groupings of troops defending against enemy 
tactical missiles.27
NATO’s new Strategy Concept. In recent decade the context within NATO has 
been functioning has changed: the Alliance was enlarged, the majority of CEE countries 
joined it, and the so called “new threats to the security” were identiﬁ ed and added to 
its mission, among them the terrorism. Th ese threats have new to the Alliance aspect: 
they are rising outside NATO member states’ borders. Th is new context implied the 
need for the new strategy, such a strategy should concentrate on three points:
1. new reading of Article V, which is fundamental to European collective security;
2. determination of the terms of the global engagement of NATO;
3. searching for response to new perils.
NATO’s new Strategic Concept will provide an opportunity to revitalize and reform 
the Alliance. NATO, as a foundation of European security, must be able to address the 
full range of 21st century challenges.28
Eastern Partnership. For U.S., very important dimension of EU policies became 
recently cooperation of Brussels with former soviet republics in Eastern Europe 
and Caucasus (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). U.S. 
supports European aspirations of these states for greater integration with UE and is 
committed to partnering with a stronger European Union to advance shared goals of 
all. Regarding this issue, the main platform for cooperation between US and EU is 
promotion of democracy and prosperity in Eastern European countries that are still 
completing their democratic transition and to respond to pressing issues of mutual 
concern.29 Important factor for American administration in his topic are CEE countries, 
which invented and implemented to EU policies new quality – Eastern Partnership. It’s 
important not only because of promoting freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe, 
but also because of stabilizing borderline between NATO and CSTO.
Military cooperation. Th e most important need of support and cooperation to 
U.S. Army is rather legitimization and political support of its actions than ﬁ nancial, 
technical or human aid. Although U.S. Army is involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s 
still the most powerful and with the greatest operational capacity army in the world. 
Despite this, Poland and CEE countries are signiﬁ cant allies. Cooperation with them 
is necessary for the U.S. because of exchanging experiences: neither the USA, nor 
Western European countries experienced political and economic transition in recent 
years. It was successful in CEE countries.
27 It was an idea forced during Bill Clinton’s Presidency.
28 NATO 2020: Assured security; dynamic engagement. Analysis and recommendations of the group of 
experts on a new strategic concept for NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/oﬃ  cial_texts_63654.
htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed October 27, 2010).
29 National Security Strategy…, 42.
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What does Poland expect from the USA?
During earlier quoted conference, Radosław Sikorski, Polish Minister of Foreign 
Aﬀ airs pointed out main issues that Poland wishes to cooperate on with the US:30
1. Eastern Partnership.
2. Community of Democracies.
3. Security cooperation.
4. Visas.
In the opinion of the Authors of this paper issues put forward by the Polish Foreign 
Aﬀ airs Minister consist of the following elements:
Eastern Partnership. Th is initiative is perceived by Polish government as an 
important opportunity to strengthen relations between EU, especially CEE countries, 
and the U.S while providing development assistance to Eastern countries. Th is program 
is realization of signiﬁ cant ideas for every democratic society: extension of democracy 
and building political, economic and cultural cooperation. Th us, it is natural contact 
point for America and Europe. Th ough it’s an EU idea, it’s open for external partners, 
who can bring on new experiences, ideas and – of course – funds.
Community of Democracies. Th is is a global intergovernmental coalition of 
democratic countries, with the goal of promoting democratic rules and strengthening 
democratic norms and institutions around the world. It was funded in 2000 by 
initiative of Bronisław Geremek and Madeleine Albright.31 Most important task of this 
platform allows to exchange experiences between various democratic countries. CEE 
countries went through a successful political and economic transition and USA has 
know-how to implement this knowledge in international environment. Joint of these 
two elements may allow to implement successfully democracy in countries seeking it.
Security cooperation. For CEE countries, and especially for Poland, the most 
important aspect are the strong U.S. guaranties within NATO, ensuring us that our 
allies will fulﬁ ll their duties resulted from Article V, if there are any threats. Russian 
Federation is still perceived as possible political or military threat by CEE, just because 
of historical experiences and geographical location, military potential of Russia or 
unpredictable way of its political development.32 Although Polish government still 
30 Radosław Sikorski, “USA – Europa Środkowa: czas dokończyć dzieła!”, transl. B. Wiśniewski, Polski 
Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 52, no. 6 (listopad–grudzień 2009): 25–28.
31 Community of democracies. History and mission, http://community-democracies.org/index.php 
(accessed October 27, 2010).
32 Nowadays Russia is about to choose proper direction of self-development, probably from two 
possibilities proposed by Kremlin: either according to President D. Medvedev’s program Forward Russia!, 
assuming economical and political modernization and cooperation with EU, USA and NATO, or 
maintaining the current confrontational course promoted by Prime Minister V. Putin. It’s rather impossible 
that they, or their programs will compete in referenda or elections, but it’s still unsure how the changes of 
international environment will be percepted in Moscow and what will be future relations between CEE, 
EU, USA and Russia.
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tries to have relations as good as possible with Russia, probably only deployment of 
American troops or military installations (like part of NMD) will provide the full sense 
of security.33 Th e community of Polish-U.S. interests can be traced primarily in eﬀ orts 
to develop NATO’s New Strategic Concept, particularly in terms of strengthening the 
cohesion of the Alliance (especially new reading of Article V) and responding to new 
perils (mainly connected with prevent destabilization of the former soviet countries).
Visas. Poland is continuously excluded from the Visa Waiver Program this 
heavyweights on Polish-American relations.34 For U.S. administration it’s probably 
only technical question, but for Poland it has great political meaning. Poland is fully 
democratic country, member of many international organizations (EU, NATO, 
OECD, Th e Council of Europe, etc.), there’s no the threat of terrorism on the part 
of Poland and – what’s more important – Poland is U.S. ally, heavily involved on war 
on terror. Despite this, Polish citizens are for U.S. customs in the same group as they 
were under communist rule and as citizens of unstable Th ird World countries. Polish 
soldiers who ﬁ ght with U.S. Army against Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan, can’t visit 
USA without visa and it’s not sure if they ever receive one. What is moreover negatively 
received in Poland is unequal U.S. visa policy towards CEE countries: some, as Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia managed to participate 
in Visa Waiver Program, but other not.35 Maybe new U.S. policy, giving much more 
interest in regional cooperation, will change this situation.36
33 In the second part of November there has been a new idea of security cooperation: according to 
Polish Ministry of National Defense Bogdan Klich, the U.S. Air Force will deploy F-16 jet ﬁ ghters and 
C-130 Hercules transport planes in Poland by 2013. Th ere are no further details known yet, accept 
“political will on both sides.” Poland to host U.S. jets and C-130s, United Press International, http://www.
upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/11/22/Poland-to-host-US-jets-and-C-130s/UPI-
86081290427437/ (accessed November 22, 2010); A. Koziński, “Tarczy w Polsce nie będzie, będą za to 
amerykańskie samoloty,” Dziennik Polska Th e Times, http://www.polskatimes.pl/fakty/333687,tarczy-w-
polsce-nie-bedzie-beda-za-to-amerykanskie-samoloty,id,t.html (accessed November 22, 2010).
34 Helen Conely called it even “a cancer” ongoing U.S. an Central European countries bilateral relations. 
Helen Conely, “Europa Środkowa: w oczekiwaniu na (nowe) amerykańskie przywództwo,” Polski Przegląd 
Dyplomatyczny 53, no. 1 (styczeń–luty 2010): 21.
35 See more: Visa Waiver Program (VWP), http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.
html#travelertype (accessed October 27, 2010).
36 Th ere can be seen tendency in CEE countries to solve important matters in bilateral relations. It 
was seen during EU accession process, when individual countries tried to compete during agreeing on the 
accession chapters, trying to ﬁ nish this process no matter how were doing others. Happily, Brussels was 
determined to adopt all CEE countries in the same time. Unfortunately in this matter U.S. administration 
treats every CEE country individually, what could cause deterioration their relations or lowering relations 
with USA.
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Conclusions
Th e administration of George W. Bush in negotiation used the Polish attachment and 
aﬀ ection for the Washington: United States were usually treated by Polish politicians 
as a natural protector against Russia. Th is idea inspired the Polish politicians, whatever 
policy options they represent, so even after the accession to the European Union Poland 
has not expressed desire a deeper bounds with the European position, always bearing 
in mind the direction of U.S. policy, and deﬁ ning the Polish strategic activities based on 
American actions. Poles treated the interest of the United States as some kind of award. 
Poles treated the interest of the United States as some kind of honor. In a society there 
was built an image of Polish as a special ally of America, functioning on special rights. 
Implementation of NMD project was to be a reward for Polish pro-American attitude. 
Unlike his predecessors, Barack Obama did not see the need to create a separate line of 
US – Polish relations, especially against the background of U.S. relations with Europe. 
Th e new president has decided to calm tensions in the international environment, 
approaching the problem very pragmatically. For America, a more troubling was 
the lack of any eﬀ ect on Iran, the eﬃ  cient implementation of the Afghan mission, 
or negotiation of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction than embittering relations 
with Russia. Polish politicians, instead of moaning about abandoning by the most 
signiﬁ cant ally, should direct its attention to creating a more self-vision of the Polish 
foreign and security policy. Poland should concentrate on seeking the partners and 
allies among the closest neighbors, in particular within the European Union. It is 
signiﬁ cant that EU strengthens integration, especially in Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) dimension and Poland is one of Eastern Partnership founder. Also 
creation and realization of New Strategic Concept for NATO may be important ﬁ eld of 
activity for Polish foreign policy. Attempt to reactivate the Visegrad Group, as a group 
of inﬂ uence within EU would be ﬁ ne option. Th e problem is that now its members, 
like the Czech Republic, are no longer so willing to cooperate, willing not to put at risk 
their relations with EU “net payers.” Poland should accept the fact that it no longer 
works in the category of privileged partners of America, but it functions as one of the 
many good allies of the United States. 
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